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Indexing the lis pendens:
Dyer v Martinez, 2007
Roger Bernhardt
Filing of lis pendens with county recorder does not impart constructive notice until
indexed.
Dyer v Martinez (2007) 147 CA4th 1240, 54 CR3d 907
On September 9, 2004, Dyer sued the Rojases for specific performance and damages based on
their alleged breach of a sales agreement for real property and, on the same day, deposited a lis
pendens with the county recorder’s office for recording. Although the lis pendens reflected a
September 9, 2004, recording date, it was not indexed until September 14, 2004. On September
10, 2004, escrow closed on the sale of the property to Martinez, who purchased it through loans
provided by Argent, secured by trust deeds that listed Town & Country as trustee.
Dyer filed an amended complaint for breach of contract, quiet title, and declaratory relief
against Martinez, Argent, Town & Country (collectively, Defendants), and the Rojases, against
whom she continued to seek specific performance. Defaults were entered against the Rojases.
The trial court granted the remaining Defendants summary judgment on the ground that Dyer’s
lis pendens failed to provide constructive notice of her claim against the property, and ordered
the lis pendens expunged. Dyer petitioned for writ of mandate directing the superior court to
vacate its expungement order.
The court of appeal deemed the writ petition to be a notice of appeal from the judgment and
affirmed. For more than a century, the law in California has been that a recorded document does
not provide constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser of real property unless and until it can be
located by a diligent title search, even if the literal wording of the relevant statute provided that
the document imparted constructive notice from the date of filing with the recorder. To rely on
the fiction of constructive notice and abrogate the requirement of actual notice, the party seeking
recordation must ensure that all of the statutory requirements are met. Real property purchasers
or mortgagees cannot be charged with constructive notice of documents they cannot locate; thus,
a lis pendens that is not indexed does not give notice because no one can find the document.
Nothing in the statute governing the recording of a lis pendens (CCP §405.24) indicates the
legislature intended to abrogate the long-standing and uniformly applied rule that purchasers do
not receive constructive notice if a diligent title records search would not locate the documents
providing that notice. The statute provides that constructive notice is given only when an
instrument is recorded, not simply when an instrument is delivered to the recorder’s office.
Given the history of constructive notice in California and the legislature’s comment that
enactment of §405.24 was not intended to change existing law, the term “recording” in that
statute means “recorded as prescribed by law.” Government Code §27250 requires indexing of
all recorded lis pendens. Thus, a lis pendens does not provide constructive notice until it has been
properly indexed.
Although failing to impute constructive notice until a lis pendens is indexed may create
uncertainty because the claimant has no control over when the recorder indexes the document,

the uncertainty would be greater if a purchaser of real estate could not rely on a diligent search of
public records to reveal a prior claimant’s interest. Placing the risk of loss due to a recorder’s
delay in indexing on the claimant provides an incentive to diligently deposit the lis pendens for
recordation. Placing the risk on the innocent purchaser or the purchaser’s title insurer does
nothing to ensure the lis pendens is properly and timely recorded.
The Editor’s Take: The plaintiff had to lose this case if the recording system was going to
work; otherwise, none of the rest of us could ever rely on the indexes. But reaching that
common-sense outcome is made difficult by the fact that the literal language of our statutes
seems to dictate a contrary result. Our lis pendens act provides that a recorded document
gives constructive notice “[f]rom the time of recording” (CCP §405.24); “recording” is
defined (in CC §1170) as meaning “deposited in the recorder’s office, with the proper
officer,” without adding that the recorder’s office had better next make appropriate index
entries showing its location in the official records so that searchers can thereafter find it. A
document not properly indexed should not be deemed recorded, even though it may have
been left with the recorder (and even though it may also have been placed in the official
records), since no one will ever come across it thereafter. Thank heavens our courts have
gone activist on this issue and displaced the literal and unworkable statutory definition in
favor of a functional one that makes recording depend on findability.
Not all courts are so bold. Last year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court chose the literal
version of the definition to conclude that a mortgage indexed under the wrong name
nevertheless gave constructive notice to a subsequent party who had no actual knowledge of
it because it had been properly delivered to the recorder’s office. First Citizens Nat’l Bank v
Sherwood (Penn 2005) 879 A2d 178. It took a considerable amount of work by the
Pennsylvania Bar Association to get that statute amended to undo that result, by changing
the statute to say that a document gives constructive notice only if it is “indexed properly.”
The Pennsylvania court’s decision may seem silly, but that is considered to be the rule in a
majority of states, according to Patton & Palomar on Land Titles §68 (3d ed 2003). (While I
am suspect of that count, because many of the citations are pretty old, it is a fact that the
Idaho Supreme Court reached the same result just three years ago—Miller v Simonson
(Idaho 2004) 92 P3d 537—as did courts in Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Vermont, and, more
recently, West Virginia, where indexing is considered merely a ministerial act, according to
Patton & Palomar.)
More surprisingly, the drafters of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code consciously
take that same position. Section 9–517 provides, “The failure of the filing office to index a
record correctly does not affect the effectiveness of the filed record.” (Emphasis added.)
(See also Com C §9517.) They say that mistakes don’t happen that often and they don’t
want to overburden the filing office by having everybody coming back to double-check
their filings, although that worry is rather hard for me to understand given the ability to
computer search those files from one’s own office.
Making life sensible for searchers, as this case does, comes at a price, however, and filers
are the ones who will have to pay it. They will lose even if they have done everything

right—i.e., left the right document at the right office with the right fee—but a governmental
clerk then failed to properly index it thereafter. Under a definition that deems a document
recorded only when it has been properly indexed, the filing party has to double-check that
this critical last step was done right.
In many cases, a search a few days later will show whether that was the case, but not
always. Here, for instance, this plaintiff lost not because of a recorder’s error, but because
of its delay, in a situation where time was critical. The plaintiff had to get her lis pendens on
file fast in order to stop a closing that was to occur the next day. (The facts are not clear, but
I assume that the timing of her filing was not just coincidental.) Ignoring the merits of her
strategy and claim, her problem is one that I do not know how to solve.
Government Code §27320 says that the recorder shall record any instrument deposited
there “without delay,” but I fear that means only copy it into the official records; the
obligation to index it, in Govt C §27324, does not include the same time constraint. The
Orange County Recorder’s Office indexing delay of 5 days violated no statute. (The only
other statutory speed mandate I am aware of is in CC §2941(c), where a two-business-day
deadline is imposed on the recorder, but that only requires the office to “stamp and record”
a satisfaction of mortgage form it receives in the mail.)
A frantic filer can perhaps nag the recorder to move more quickly, but I doubt that she
could get any judge to issue a writ to that effect. Possession can also give notice, so there is
the possibility of the plaintiff camping out on the property, but that idea seems subject to the
legal difficulty that a purchaser’s obligation to look at the property may not require going
there every day to do so (and the practical difficulty that a vendor in possession may not
take kindly to the plaintiff’s conduct).
In this case, because the plaintiff did appear to know that escrow was to close the next
day, she probably also knew, or could have found out, who the purchaser was or where the
closing was to be. Since actual knowledge is supposed to be a good substitute for the
constructive notice furnished by an indexed lis pendens (see Packard Bell Electronics Corp.
v Theseus, Inc. (1966) 244 CA2d 355, 363, 53 CR 300), perhaps a letter to the right place
might also work. (I would caution her to use Federal Express rather than the U.S. mails if
she really wants it to get there in time.)—Roger Bernhardt

